

EXHIBIT 2

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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO**

ANIBAL RODRIGUEZ AND JULIE ANNA
MUNIZ, individually and on behalf of all other
similarly situated,

SAN FRANCISCO

**DEFENDANT GOOGLE LLC'S
FOURTH SUPPLEMENTAL
RESPONSES AND OBJECTIONS TO
PLAINTIFFS' INTERROGATORIES,
SET ONE**

Judge: Hon. Richard Seeborg
Courtroom: 3, 17th Floor
Action Filed: July 14, 2020

PROPOUNDING PARTY: PLAINTIFFS ANIBAL RODRIGUEZ AND JULIEANNA MUNIZ
RESPONDING PARTY: DEFENDANT GOOGLE LLC
SET NO.: ONE

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1 on that Google data collection, (c) what impact if any an app’s disabling of analytics data
2 collection has on that Google data collection, and (d) what impact if any an app’s decision to use
3 or not use any Google services apart from Firebase SDK has on that Google data collection.

4 **RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1:**

5 Google objects to Interrogatory No. 1 as vague and ambiguous as to the undefined term
6 “Web & App Activity.” For purposes of this response, Google construes Web & App Activity to
7 mean the account-level setting called Web & App Activity. Google further objects to this
8 Interrogatory as vague and ambiguous with respect to the phrases “Google’s data collection,”
9 “impact” and “Firebase SDK.” Google further objects that the definition of “Class Period” is
10 vague and ambiguous, as the Interrogatory defines the term to mean “the class period in this case,
11 as defined in the operative complaint,” when the “operative complaint” has changed between
12 when the Interrogatories were served and when these responses were provided, and the definition
13 of “Class Period” differs between the original and amended complaints. Google further objects
14 that the term “Class Period” is vague and ambiguous because it fails to provide a concrete range of
15 time. Google further objects to this Interrogatory to the extent that it seeks information protected
16 by the attorney-client privilege and/or the attorney work product doctrine. Google further objects
17 to this Interrogatory as unduly burdensome, overbroad, and disproportionate to the needs of the
18 Action because this Interrogatory seeks information outside of the Class Period, which has little to
19 no bearing on Plaintiffs’ claims.

20 Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Google responds as follows: The
21 type of information that can be collected through the Google Analytics for Firebase default
22 implementation, if authorized by an entity that uses Google Analytics for Firebase, includes:
23 (1) number of users and sessions, (2) first launches, (3) in-app purchases, (4) session duration,
24 (5) screen views, (6) app updates, (7) operating system updates and (8) uninstalls. If an entity
25 chooses to use Google Analytics for Firebase, it authorizes that the following parameters are
26 collected by default with every event that is collected either by default or manually, as instructed
27 by the app developer: (1) screen information, and (2) session information. Further, if an entity
28 chooses to use Google Analytics for Firebase, it authorizes the following automatically-collected

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1 device-related dimensions: (1) operating system, (2) device model, (3) language, (4) app store,
2 (5) app version, and (6) first launch time. Web & App activity is an account-level setting that
3 functions independently from Google Analytics for Firebase. Accordingly, a user turning off Web
4 & App Activity does not prevent apps from collecting data via Google Analytics for Firebase,
5 which is a separate product that apps may choose to utilize to collect and analyze their own users'
6 data.

7 **SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1:**

8 Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Google responds further as
9 follows: Since its launch, Google Analytics for Firebase has collected the following types of
10 information by default, if Google Analytics for Firebase was enabled by an app developer using
11 the Firebase SDK: (1) number of users and sessions, (2) first launches, (3) in-app purchases,
12 (4) session duration, (5) app updates, (6) operating system updates and (7) uninstalls. As of
13 October 24, 2016, Google Analytics for Firebase has also collected screen views. If an entity
14 chooses to use Google Analytics for Firebase, it authorizes that the following parameters are
15 collected by default with every event that is collected either by default or manually, as instructed
16 by the app developer: (1) screen information, and (2) session information. Google Analytics for
17 Firebase has collected these parameters by default since its launch. Further, if an entity chooses to
18 use Google Analytics for Firebase, it authorizes the following automatically-collected device-
19 related dimensions: (1) operating system, (2) device model, (3) language, (4) app store, (5) app
20 version, and (6) first launch time. Google Analytics for Firebase has automatically collected these
21 device-related dimensions since its launch.

22 Web & App activity is an account-level setting that functions independently from Google
23 Analytics for Firebase. Accordingly, a user turning off Web & App Activity does not prevent
24 apps from collecting data via Google Analytics for Firebase, which is a separate product that apps
25 may choose to utilize to collect and analyze their own users' data. The data logged by Google
26 Analytics for Firebase in its default implementation are not collected if a developer has not
27 enabled Google Analytics for Firebase. There are other products and features that are part of
28 Firebase SDK that may collect overlapping pieces of data, such as device model, app updates, and

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1 other types of data, but all such functionality is publicly documented and intentionally
2 implemented by app developers. Each such product and feature, none of which are implicated by
3 the First Amended Complaint, separately obtain consent and publicly disclose their functionality.

4 Finally, footnote 13 of the First Amended Complaint cites
5 <https://firebase.google.com/docs/app-indexing/android/log-actions>, which is a webpage dealing
6 with a separate Firebase SDK product called “App Indexing.” As the cited webpage notes, App
7 Indexing cannot collect event data unless certain conditions are met, including that a user has
8 turned their Web & App Activity Control to “on.”

9 **SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1:**

10 Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Google responds further as
11 follows:

12 Google carefully processes information it receives from app developers via Google
13 Analytics for Firebase (“GA for Firebase”). As explained herein, entities that choose to use GA
14 for Firebase must incorporate it into their apps, enable its function, and thereby cause it to begin
15 logging event data that is subsequently uploaded to Google servers for analysis and reporting.
16 Google takes measures to process event data sent to Google via GA for Firebase according to the
17 type of consent each user gives. For example, Google runs consent checks on the data during
18 several processing steps, and it only associates event data with a specific user when the user has
19 consented to that, including by having the WAA control turned to “on.” When consent is lacking,
20 Google takes several sophisticated technological steps to ensure that event data cannot be
21 associated with a specific user, including by imposing several technological barriers to what is
22 known as unauthorized “joining” of logs together to de-anonymize users. Unauthorized joining is
23 forbidden, and Google also takes several steps to ensure access to the logs in question is restricted.
24 Google does not join user event data collected via GA for Firebase to re-identify anonymized data.
25 Google’s customers are likewise never given access to data that could be used to de-anonymize
26 users.

27 Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint cites and quotes public documentation about GA for
28 Firebase to demonstrate the types of user app interaction data, or “event data” that Plaintiffs allege

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1 Google is improperly collecting. In order for the data collection described in each of those pieces
2 of documentation to occur, an app developer must enable GA for Firebase. If app developers don’t
3 enable GA for Firebase, the data that would otherwise be sent to Google servers by GA for
4 Firebase isn’t sent to Google servers. Google doesn’t implement in Firebase SDK any “shadow”
5 copy of GA for Firebase that operates regardless of whether a developer has enabled GA for
6 Firebase, nor does Google has any “secret scripts” that ignore the consent settings of users in order
7 to connect event data to specific users’ profiles. GA for Firebase will not store event data
8 connected to a specific user’s profile unless the app has permitted it and a user has opted into
9 certain features, namely: the supplemental checkbox under the WAA control (sWAA), which can
10 only be turned on if WAA is also turned on; Google Ads Personalization (GAP); and the
11 supplemental checkbox under the GAP control (NAC). Finally, based on a reasonable
12 investigation, Google has been unable to identify any impact an app’s decision to use or not use a
13 Google product or service other than Firebase SDK would have on the functioning of GA for
14 Firebase as described below.

15 With regard to the other products and features that are part of Firebase SDK that may
16 collect overlapping pieces of data, such as device model, app updates, and other types of data,
17 such functionality is publicly documented including on Google’s public help center pages at
18 GOOG-RDGZ-00013288 - GOOG-RDGZ-00013449, which can also be viewed at
19 firebase.google.com and support.google.com.

20 **THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1:**

21 Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Google responds further as
22 follows:

23 Google carefully processes information it receives from app developers via Google
24 Analytics for Firebase (“GA for Firebase”). As explained herein, entities that choose to use GA
25 for Firebase must incorporate it into their apps, enable its function, and thereby cause it to begin
26 logging event data that is subsequently uploaded to Google servers for analysis and reporting.
27 Google takes measures to process event data sent to Google via GA for Firebase according to the
28 type of consent each user gives. For example, Google runs consent checks on the data during

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1 several processing steps, and it only associates event data with a specific user when the user has
2 consented to that, including by having the WAA control turned to “on.” When consent is lacking,
3 Google takes several sophisticated technological steps to ensure that event data cannot be
4 associated with a specific user, including by imposing several technological barriers to what is
5 known as unauthorized “joining” of logs together to de-anonymize users. Unauthorized joining is
6 forbidden, and Google also takes several steps to ensure access to the logs in question is restricted.
7 Google does not join user event data collected via GA for Firebase to re-identify anonymized data.
8 Google’s customers are likewise never given access to data that could be used to de-anonymize
9 users.

10 Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint cites and quotes public documentation about GA for
11 Firebase to demonstrate the types of user app interaction data, or “event data” that Plaintiffs allege
12 Google is improperly collecting. In order for the data collection described in each of those pieces
13 of documentation to occur, an app developer must enable GA for Firebase. If app developers don’t
14 enable GA for Firebase, the data that would otherwise be sent to Google servers by GA for
15 Firebase isn’t sent to Google servers. Google doesn’t implement in Firebase SDK any “shadow”
16 copy of GA for Firebase that operates regardless of whether a developer has enabled GA for
17 Firebase, nor does Google has any “secret scripts” that ignore the consent settings of users in order
18 to connect event data to specific users’ profiles. GA for Firebase will not store event data
19 connected to a specific user’s profile unless the app has permitted it and a user has opted into
20 certain features, namely: the supplemental checkbox under the WAA control (sWAA), which can
21 only be turned on if WAA is also turned on; Google Ads Personalization (GAP); and the
22 supplemental checkbox under the GAP control (NAC). Finally, based on a reasonable
23 investigation, Google has been unable to identify any impact an app’s decision to use or not use a
24 Google product or service other than Firebase SDK would have on the functioning of GA for
25 Firebase as described below.


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27

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At a high level, the data flow of event data associated with GA for Firebase can be thought of conceptually as follows:



Each of these steps is discussed in further detail below.

1. Data Logging

When app developers enable GA for Firebase, code authored by Google and activated by developers logs certain user interaction events automatically, such as the first opening of an app or when a user clicks on a certain part of the app. *See generally* <https://support.google.com/firebase/answer/9234069?hl=en>.

GA for Firebase on Android also logs: **DSID** (if the developer permits it, e.g., if Google Signals is enabled for the Google Analytics property), which makes it possible to check against a specific user’s privacy settings to ensure consent is provided; and **adid**, or “Ad ID,” which is used for advertising purposes under certain circumstances as described more fully below.¹ On iOS, GA for Firebase logs **IDFA**, or “Identifier for Advertiser,” which is the rough equivalent of the Ad ID on Android.

¹ See https://www.google.com/url?q=https://firebase.google.com/docs/analytics/configure-data-collection?platform%3Dandroid&sa=D&source=editors&ust=1623176595924000&usg=AOvVaw2T8Y_BUbEk1Od-0SpMEX0d.

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1 GA for Firebase also logs the device’s ads personalization opt-out setting: “opt-out of ads
2 personalization, or OOOAP for Android and “limit ad tracking,” or LAT for iOS.

3 GA for Firebase also logs a unique `app_instance_id`, which identifies the app session of
4 the particular app running on a particular device. `app_instance_id` is not persistent; it can be
5 refreshed when users take certain actions such as re-installing apps, certain updates to apps, and
6 other similar actions.

7 Finally, for ads interactions, GA for Firebase also logs `aeid`, or “Ad Event ID,” which is a
8 unique identifier for the specific ad interaction logged in order to enable integration between GA
9 for Firebase and AdMob if the customer has linked their AdMob app to Google Analytics.

10 This logging occurs at the same time as the interactions that trigger the event. For example,
11 when a user clicks a specific button that the app developer has chosen to track using GA for
12 Firebase, that button click is logged as it occurs. It is typically not uploaded to Google servers
13 until later.

14 **2. Data Upload**

15 Apps with GA for Firebase enabled log and send information to Google via GA for
16 Firebase code in a packet sometimes referred to as a “HitBundle.” These packets contain (1)
17 event information including `app_instance_id`, (2) DSID/IDFA for consent checks, and (3) non-
18 personally identifiable information (PII) for user properties (if the app developer chooses to
19 include such data). A HitBundle can contain multiple events grouped together. Event information
20 includes different types of user-interaction data, as discussed above. The predefined and
21 recommended events and user properties are publicly defined by Google. User properties are
22 slowly changing data that describe the device or user of the device that an app developer may
23 send, but it cannot send PII.

24 All of the HitBundle data is sent to Google in a single transmission. In other words, the
25 app-interaction event data and user properties are sent to Google in the same packet as the
26 DSID/IDFA, which is the information that allows Google to run consent checks.

27 For Android apps with Google Play Services enabled, GA for Firebase data is collected
28 from all apps into a central file called `app_measurement.db`, which is periodically uploaded to

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1 Google’s servers. Google does this because it saves battery for users, whose devices would
2 otherwise be initiating more uploads every day. On iOS devices, this is not possible, so each GA-
3 for-Firebase-enabled app periodically transmits the data to Google’s servers individually.

4 In all cases, data is first logged by GA for Firebase, recorded on the user’s device in the
5 appropriate file, and then subsequently uploaded to Google servers.

6 **3. Consent Checks and Technical Barriers to Joining**

7 HitBundles are received by Google at a “collection endpoint,” where the data is stored in
8 short-term memory. Before any data is ever written to disk, the server completes several important
9 steps designed to protect user privacy. The first step is to check if the customer has enabled
10 Google Signals. Everything described below regarding data duplication and consent checks is
11 gated on whether the customer has enabled Google Signals. If the customer hasn’t enabled Google
12 Signals, the HitBundle is treated purely pseudonymously.

13 A preliminary step before the consent check occurs is data duplication. A single copy of
14 the data packet received from a user’s mobile device is made. This is done to facilitate the
15 eventual data logging that respects user consent choices. One copy could become tied to a user’s
16 account if consent checks permit it; the other will become a pseudonymous log. During this time
17 period, the copies are stored in short-term memory. The time between receipt and logging is
18 typically less than five minutes.

19 Then, Google checks to see if a user is signed into their Google Account and whether they
20 have opted into certain privacy controls, namely: the supplemental checkbox under the WAA
21 control (sWAA), which can only be turned on if WAA is also turned on; Google Ads
22 Personalization (GAP); and the supplemental checkbox under the GAP control (NAC). Each of
23 WAA, sWAA, GAP, and NAC are account-level Web & App Activity and Ads Personalization
24 controls. If sWAA, GAP, and NAC are all turned on, the result of the consent check is that the
25 data can be tied to a user’s Google account in what is known as “GAIA space.” If any of these
26 controls are off, then the data isn’t joined to a user’s Google account, and therefore not logged in
27 “GAIA space.”

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1 The consent check actually happens in several steps, all in short-term memory, before any
2 data is written to disk, *i.e.*, stored: (a) data is received at Google’s servers and, if Google Signals is
3 enabled, it is duplicated to facilitate logging; (b) Google uses a server to check whether a user is
4 logged into a Google Account and whether consent has been given to join data to the account (the
5 sWAA, GAP, and NAC settings discussed above); and (c) the data sets are cleaned and some data
6 is regenerated to add additional obstacles to joining data.

7 To do this check, Google uses a DSID (IDFA on iOS). It tells Google who the user is by
8 checking the DSID, which is an encrypted GAIA identifier. There will be no DSID in the
9 HitBundle if the user is not signed into a Google Account. On iOS devices, the IDFA is associated
10 with GAIA when users have logged into their Google Account and have not limited ad tracking.
11 Google also checks to make sure the app developer consents to the tying of GA for Firebase data
12 to users’ accounts.²

13 Importantly, the Google server that receives the HitBundle, called [REDACTED], cannot decrypt
14 the DSID. This is by design. Instead, [REDACTED] must send the encrypted DSID to a different Google
15 server that performs the consent check and then returns to [REDACTED] either a “no consent” signal, or an
16 encrypted GAIA ID. As a result, the hit bundles in short term memory on the [REDACTED] server cannot
17 reflect a user’s identity until a “yes consent” signal is received from a different server, which itself
18 never receives the measurement data logged by GA for Firebase. All of this occurs in short term
19 memory. The upshot of this is that the physical machine that receives the encrypted DSID from
20 user devices isn’t able to decrypt it, and the physical machine that decrypts the DSID doesn’t
21 receive the measurement data, it only gets the fields that can be used to check identity. This is all
22 done to make it even less possible that a bad actor could infiltrate Google’s system and perform an
23 unauthorized “join.”

24

25

26 ² See
27 https://www.google.com/url?q=https://support.google.com/analytics/answer/7532985?hl%3Den%23zippy%3D%252Cin-this-article&sa=D&source=editors&ust=1623176595926000&usg=AOvVaw1v59Uqg6gqH_XGgl4Z76xO.

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If any aspect of the consent check fails, the user data is not stored in GAIA space, and the DSIS/IDFA is deleted.

After the consent check is completed and data is duplicated into two logs, Google removes data from each log to prevent “joining,” which is a technical term that refers to re-identifying pseudonymized users by joining data from disparate parts of data held by Google together. Google takes a number of steps throughout its organization to prevent unauthorized joining of user data, and employees are, generally speaking, barred from doing it. Encryption is used to prevent Google personnel from identifying the data without authorization. Decryption keys are tightly controlled, and destroyed after a set period of time, making it impossible to re-join the data.

From the signed-in GAIA copy of data, Google removes all pseudonymous identifiers. From the signed-out pseudonymous log, Google removes all signed-in identifiers. The result is that the two logs don’t overlap identifiers that could be used to join the logs together.

Google additionally regenerates data to prevent deterministic joining. A “deterministic” or “probabilistic” join would allow a complicated algorithm to use brute force and probability to guess which data belongs to which person. While the data is still in short term memory, Google creates “fuzziness,” or slight errors, in data to prevent this. For example, Google adds random error into timestamps so they can’t be matched together with timestamps elsewhere.

4. Differentiated Logging

Pseudonymous short-term logs have a 56-day retention period. They store the pseudonymized copy of the user interaction data—that is, they don’t contain any identifying information, so it’s not possible to tell to which user the event data belongs. They are used to create aggregated event data logs for customer use. GAIA short-term logs contain the same event data but keyed to a specific user.

To ensure that joining is practically impossible, Google takes several steps to scrub these logs of data that overlaps with data in other logs. Pseudonymous logs don’t contain GAIA IDs. GAIA logs don’t contain Device ID or app_instance_id. Both logs do contain aeid, or Ad Event ID, but in the pseudonymous log, aeid is encrypted with a 6-day retention key that is different from the encryption key used to encrypt Ad Event ID in GAIA logs. Further, in GAIA logs, aeid is

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1 “salted” as well, meaning random data is added to it to make it even harder to match it to the aeid
2 stored in pseudonymous logs. As a practical matter, connecting these to each other is impossible.

3 5. Google’s Encryption Technology

4 As further background, Google’s encryption technology creates new encrypted keys every
5 day. This enables the encryption keys to be retained for a fixed period (for example 60 days) of
6 time for decryption purposes. Once the period of time passes, the keys are deleted, making
7 decryption impossible. GA for Firebase also uses a different encryption key for the same user ID
8 in GAIA space as compared to pseudonymous space (and in the case of aeid, in AdMob
9 space). For that reason, it is prohibitively expensive to decrypt data from one log (e.g.,
10 pseudonymous) and join the data with another log.

11 For a set period of time, some IDs (device ID, app instance ID, and ad event ID) are stored
12 and encrypted to allow Google to account for possible delays in data transmission and to fix any
13 errors in data processing, including at customers’ (i.e., app developers’) request.

14 *Device ID and app-instance ID* are stored in encrypted form for 60 days. The reason the
15 keys are stored for 60 days is because there are sometimes errors in the logs that require
16 reprocessing of data. The 60-day window allows for customers to request reprocessing. It also
17 allows Google to scan the logs to determine the amount of data affected by errors, which informs
18 solutions to code issues. Google personnel are barred from using these keys without authorization,
19 Google has monitors in place to ensure such unauthorized use doesn’t happen, and access to the
20 keys is tightly controlled. As a general matter, humans who work for Google would have no
21 reason to gain access to these keys, and they don’t. Computers do use them to reprocess data, as
22 described here, but this happens without humans learning the keys, not unlike swiping a credit
23 card at a grocery store.

24 *Ad event IDs* are stored in encrypted form for 6 days. These IDs are specific to a user’s
25 particular interaction with an ad. Ad event IDs allow Google to expand the Google Analytics
26 pseudonymous data set with data from ADMob logs if the user has provided the proper
27 permissions. Where a user interacts with a product that uses AdMob, that interaction is stored in
28 AdMob logs and that data is joined to the Analytics data set using the ad-event ID.

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1 The encryption keys are retained for 6 days to allow for processing time and errors. The
2 processing happens daily and in some cases takes a few hours. If reprocessing of the data is
3 necessary due to some error, the 6-day window allows Google time to do the reprocessing.

4 As discussed above, the ad event ID is the only unique ID common to both GAIA space
5 and signed-out space that would allow for joining of data to a specific user. This means that for
6 the 6-day window in which the ad event ID is stored with encryption, it is theoretically possible
7 for someone with access to both ad event ID encryption keys to join data.

8 Google takes several steps to ensure this does not happen. As described above, Google
9 generates new encryption keys each day and it uses a different key for the same user ad event ID
10 in GAIA space as compared to pseudonymous space. Access to the encryption keys is tightly
11 controlled and even the teams of engineers that create the code for GA for Firebase and related
12 products/services do not have access to the keys. Google also protects the code that requires use
13 of encryption keys. Once the 6-day period has elapsed, it is not possible for Google (or any other
14 bad actor) to rejoin data stored in the pseudonymous logs with a user profile using the ad event ID.

15 Further, Google uses a restricted need-based access process and audit procedure. To begin,
16 Google supports tiered access to the logs stored by GA for Firebase. None of the tiers includes
17 personally identifiable information, but the default access level, for example, includes only event
18 data, so Google employees cannot see any identifiers at all. Querying a log past the default state
19 (i.e., geolocation logs or raw logs) requires a request ticket that allows Google to audit and track
20 the request. Through that system, teams have to explain why they need a specific level of beyond-
21 default access. Even if such access is granted, Google does not allow access forever. There are
22 temporal restrictions: access is granted for a certain time frame after which teams will need to re-
23 request access.

24 **6. Use of User Data by Customers**

25 User data is made available to external customers from whom the data originally was
26 transmitted so they can conduct analytics and other marketing campaigns.

27 When data is reported to app developers, it is done so on an aggregated level. After
28 pseudonymous logs are created, a subset of the data in them is then used to create the database for

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1 the back-end of GA for Firebase that feeds customers with aggregated reports. None of the ID data
2 in that database overlaps with data in GAIA space, so no joining between them is possible. Both
3 datasets do include event data, however, though timestamps are made “fuzzy” to prevent joining,
4 as discussed above.

5 **7. Use of Pseudonymous User Data by Google**

6 Google uses user data collected via GA for Firebase across teams for product development,
7 improvement, and diagnostics. As discussed above, if a user has provided consent, and if the
8 AdMob and GA for Firebase Administrators at the customer have linked their AdMob account to
9 their GA for Firebase app, Google can also join event data from GA for Firebase logs with
10 AdMob log data in order to target advertising to users, all without personally identifying the user.

11 With regard to the other products and features that are part of Firebase SDK that may
12 collect overlapping pieces of data, such as device model, app updates, and other types of data,
13 such functionality is publicly documented including on Google’s public help center pages at
14 GOOG-RDGZ-00013288 - GOOG-RDGZ-00013449, which can also be viewed at
15 firebase.google.com and support.google.com.

16 **FOURTH SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1:**

17 Subject to and without waiving the foregoing, and without waiving any claim of privilege
18 or protection of the work product doctrine, Google further responds as follows:

19 Google carefully processes information it receives from app developers via Google
20 Analytics for Firebase (“GA for Firebase”). As explained herein, entities that choose to use GA
21 for Firebase must incorporate it into their apps, enable its function, and thereby cause it to begin
22 logging event data that is subsequently uploaded to Google servers for analysis and reporting.
23 Google takes measures to process event data sent to Google via GA for Firebase according to the
24 type of consent each user gives. For example, Google runs consent checks on the data during
25 several processing steps, and it only associates event data with a specific user when the user has
26 consented to that, including by having the WAA control turned to “on.” When consent is lacking,
27 Google takes several sophisticated technological steps to ensure that event data cannot be
28 associated with a specific user, including by imposing several technological barriers to what is

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
1 known as unauthorized “joining” of logs together to de-anonymize users. Unauthorized joining is
2 forbidden, and Google also takes several steps to ensure access to the logs in question is restricted.
3 Google does not join user event data collected via GA for Firebase to re-identify anonymized data.
4 Google’s customers are likewise never given access to data that could be used to de-anonymize
5 users.

6 Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint cites and quotes public documentation about GA for
7 Firebase to demonstrate the types of user app interaction data, or “event data” that Plaintiffs allege
8 Google is improperly collecting. In order for the data collection described in each of those pieces
9 of documentation to occur, an app developer must enable GA for Firebase. If app developers don’t
10 enable GA for Firebase, the data that would otherwise be sent to Google servers by GA for
11 Firebase isn’t sent to Google servers. Google doesn’t implement in Firebase SDK any “shadow”
12 copy of GA for Firebase that operates regardless of whether a developer has enabled GA for
13 Firebase, nor does Google has any “secret scripts” that ignore the consent settings of users in order
14 to connect event data to specific users’ profiles. GA for Firebase will not store event data
15 connected to a specific user’s profile unless the app has permitted it and a user has opted into
16 certain features, namely: the supplemental checkbox under the WAA control (sWAA), which can
17 only be turned on if WAA is also turned on; Google Ads Personalization (GAP); and the
18 supplemental checkbox under the GAP control (NAC). Finally, based on a reasonable
19 investigation, Google has been unable to identify any impact an app’s decision to use or not use a
20 Google product or service other than Firebase SDK would have on the functioning of GA for
21 Firebase as described below.

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At a high level, the data flow of event data associated with GA for Firebase can be thought of conceptually as follows:



Each of these steps is discussed in further detail below.

1. Data Logging

When app developers enable GA for Firebase, code authored by Google and activated by developers logs certain user interaction events automatically, such as the first opening of an app or when a user clicks on a certain part of the app. *See generally* <https://support.google.com/firebase/answer/9234069?hl=en>.

GA for Firebase on Android also logs: **DSID** (if the developer permits it, e.g., if Google Signals is enabled for the Google Analytics property), which makes it possible to check against a specific user’s privacy settings to ensure consent is provided; and **adid**, or “Ad ID,” which is used for advertising purposes under certain circumstances as described more fully below.³ On iOS, GA for Firebase logs **IDFA**, or “Identifier for Advertiser,” which is the rough equivalent of the Ad ID on Android.

GA for Firebase also logs the device’s ads personalization opt-out setting: “opt-out of ads personalization, or OOOAP for Android and “limit ad tracking,” or LAT for iOS.

³ See https://www.google.com/url?q=https://firebase.google.com/docs/analytics/configure-data-collection?platform%3Dandroid&sa=D&source=editors&ust=1623176595924000&usg=AOvVaw2T8Y_BUbEk1Od-0SpMEX0d.

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1 GA for Firebase customers can also choose to disable personalized advertising for the
 2 whole app, geographic regions, specific users, or specific events or user properties.⁴

3 GA for Firebase also logs a unique `app_instance_id`, which identifies the app session of
 4 the particular app running on a particular device. `app_instance_id` is not persistent; it can be
 5 refreshed when users take certain actions such as re-installing apps, certain updates to apps, and
 6 other similar actions. It is also refreshed automatically when customers reset their advertising
 7 identifier.

8 Finally, for ads interactions, GA for Firebase also logs `aeid`, or “Ad Event ID,” which is a
 9 unique identifier for the specific ad interaction logged in order to enable integration between GA
 10 for Firebase and AdMob if the customer has linked their AdMob app to Google Analytics.

11 Event-logging occurs at the same time as the interactions that trigger the event. For
 12 example, when a user clicks a specific button that the app developer has chosen to track using GA
 13 for Firebase, that button click is logged as it occurs. It is typically not uploaded to Google servers
 14 until later.

15 **2. Data Logging Technical Details**

16 A comprehensive list of measurement data collected by Google Analytics for Firebase is
 17 [here](#). Measurement data collected for Google Analytics for Firebase includes:

- 18 • IDFA/IDFV (on iOS); adid (on Android) as well as the LAT setting
- 19 • `app_instance_id`, which is a randomly generated identifier (UUID) on a device
 for a given app (plays a similar role to a first party cookie on the web)
- 20 • `app_id`, aka `bundle_id` (on iOS) and `package_id` (on Android)
- 21 • hash of developer cert (if applicable for the mobile platform)
- 22 • IP address (for geo lookup)
- 23 • information about the OS, OS version and device information
- 24 • First launch events, including timestamp of the first launch

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 27
 28 ⁴ See <https://support.google.com/analytics/answer/9626162?hl=en>.

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- 1 ● In App Purchase events, including timestamp of the event, transaction ID,
2 product ID, product name, price, currency code and quantity. IAP data will be
3 collected automatically on iOS. The Google Analytics customer is required to
4 link their Analytics property to Google Play to collect IAP data automatically on
5 Android.
- 6 ● collect referrer param string associated with the last campaign click that is
7 attributable to a conversion

8 Google Analytics for Firebase also facilitates the logging of events related to Firebase
9 Cloud Messaging (FCM). The FCM SDK logs the following events through Google Analytics for
10 Firebase, when present and enabled:

- 11 ● notification_receive : when the push notification was received by the app
- 12 ● notification_foreground : when the push notification was received by the app
13 while the app was in the foreground
- 14 ● notification_open : when the user chose to open the notification
- 15 ● notification_dismiss : when the user chose to dismiss the notification

16 While the FCM SDK does log debug messages corresponding to each of these events,
17 those logs are entirely private to the app itself and can only be accessed by the app or by the
18 developer when they have connected their debug device to their development host via USB. FCM
19 does not log corresponding events to their own server. FCM uses the Google Analytics for
20 Firebase standard means of logging events which results in these notification-related events being
21 bundled and uploaded along with all other app events. Google Analytics for Firebase is the single
22 owner and authority on the events enumerated above.

23 Each of these FCM events also logs corresponding event parameters to contextualize the
24 push notification. These event parameters are:

- 25 ● gcm_message_name: the name of the message in the FCM “Message Composer”
26 UX

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- 1 • gcm_message_time: the time at which the developer chose to broadcast push
2 notifications. Alternatively, if the developer chose to use “device-local” time,
3 message_time indicates a delivery time relative to each device’s time zone.
- 4 • gcm_message_use_device_time : a flag which determines the interpretation of
5 message_time.
- 6 • gcm_message_id: a unique ID for the message campaign
- 7 • gcm_sender_id: the sender ID corresponds to the developer’s cloud project ID

8 These parameters correspond to fields in message campaigns launched by the GCM
9 Product on the Web. None of these parameters are associated with users or devices.

10 These events are aggregated in tables in a manner consistent with all other events.

11 Furthermore, app developers are able to send events and user properties to Google Analytics for
12 Firebase. An event has a string name, and up to 25 event parameters (name / value pairs). It
13 represents an event of interest happening inside the app on a particular device. Multiple events
14 may be batched together into multiple HitBundle. In addition to events, a HitBundle may also
15 carry user properties (name / value pairs), which are slowly changing data describing the device or
16 the user of the device. App developers should not send PII in either event names, event parameters
17 or user properties. Doing so is considered a violation of GMP TOS.

18 The app events data are joined with additional information on the server side, e.g., a
19 device’s screen resolution is derived based on a device model name. GA for Firebase collects app
20 events data for mobile apps that are built with the Google Mobile Platform. The Firebase
21 Analytics SDK also facilitates the logging of events related to Firebase Crashlytics.

22 The Firebase Crashlytics SDK will log the following events through Google Analytics, if
23 present and enabled:

24 *app_exception*

25 In addition to logging this new event, Firebase Crashlytics captures the last N events that
26 are logged on the device and -- upon an exception/crash -- reports these to their own BE.

27 The Google Analytics for Firebase SDK facilitates the setting of User Properties related to
28 Firebase Cloud Messaging and Firebase Remote Config (aka Config).

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1 The Firebase Cloud Messaging SDK will set the following User Property using the Google
2 Analytics API, when present and enabled:

3 firebase_last_notification (working name)

4 The Firebase Remote Config SDK will set the following User Properties using the Google
5 Analytics API:

6 firebase_experiment1_group (working name)

7 firebase_experiment2_group (working name)

8 The Google Analytics for Firebase SDK will collect the Instance ID (IID) for the purposes
9 of Audience List exporting to Firebase. The SDK collects this ID from the user’s device and
10 includes it in the HitBundle.

11 On Android, the Google Analytics for Firebase SDK will collect the Android ID on
12 devices that do not have Google Play Services installed. Devices without Google Play Services do
13 not provide resettable_device_id (AdID).

14 The Google Analytics backend also aggregates per user cumulative metrics for Firebase
15 A/B Testing (ABT). These metrics are used by ABT backends to determine the winning variation
16 of multiple candidates. The access requirements of this data is same as all other aggregated
17 Google Analytics data.

18 Google also supports view based campaign attribution (a.k.a. VTC) in addition to click
19 from both adwords and 3rd party. If a user has not clicked on an ad previously, but has an ad view
20 then Google will attribute the conversion to the ad viewed.

21 **3. Data Upload**

22 Apps with GA for Firebase enabled log and send information to Google via GA for
23 Firebase code in a packet sometimes referred to as a “HitBundle.” These packets contain (1)
24 event information including app_instance_id, (2) DSID/IDFA for consent checks, and (3) non-
25 personally identifiable information (PII) for user properties (if the app developer chooses to
26 include such data). A HitBundle can contain multiple events grouped together. Event information
27 includes different types of user-interaction data, as discussed above. The predefined and
28 recommended events and user properties are publicly defined by Google. User properties are

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1 slowly changing data that describe the device or user of the device that an app developer may
2 send, but it cannot send PII.

3 All of the HitBundle data is sent to Google in a single transmission. In other words, the
4 app-interaction event data and user properties are sent to Google in the same packet as the
5 DSID/IDFA, which is the information that allows Google to run consent checks.

6 For Android apps with Google Play Services enabled, GA for Firebase data is collected
7 from all apps into a central file called app_measurement.db, which is periodically uploaded to
8 Google’s servers. Google does this because it saves battery and reduces network data costs for
9 users, whose devices would otherwise be initiating more uploads every day. On iOS devices, this
10 is not possible, so each GA-for-Firebase-enabled app periodically transmits the data to Google’s
11 servers individually.

12 In all cases, data is first logged by GA for Firebase, recorded on the user’s device in the
13 appropriate file, and then subsequently uploaded to Google servers.

14 **4. Consent Checks and Technical Barriers to Joining**

15 HitBundles are received by Google at a “collection endpoint,” where the data is stored in
16 short-term memory. Before any data is ever written to disk, the server completes several important
17 steps designed to protect user privacy. The first step is to check if the customer has enabled
18 Google Signals. Everything described below regarding data duplication and consent checks is
19 gated on whether the customer has enabled Google Signals. If the customer hasn’t enabled Google
20 Signals, the HitBundle is treated purely pseudonymously.

21 A preliminary step before the consent check occurs is data duplication. A single copy of
22 the data packet received from a user’s mobile device is made. This is done to facilitate the
23 eventual data logging that respects user consent choices. One copy could become tied to a user’s
24 account if consent checks permit it; the other will become a pseudonymous log. During this time
25 period, the copies are stored in short-term memory. The time between receipt and logging is
26 typically less than five minutes.

27 Then, Google checks to see if a user is signed into their Google Account and whether they
28 have opted into certain privacy controls, namely: the supplemental checkbox under the WAA

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control (sWAA), which can only be turned on if WAA is also turned on; Google Ads Personalization (GAP); and the supplemental checkbox under the GAP control (NAC). Each of WAA, sWAA, GAP, and NAC are account-level Web & App Activity and Ads Personalization controls. If sWAA, GAP, and NAC are all turned on, the result of the consent check is that the data can be tied to a user’s Google account in what is known as “GAIA space.” If any of these controls are off, then the data isn’t joined to a user’s Google account, and therefore not logged in “GAIA space.”

The consent check actually happens in several steps, all in short-term memory, before any data is written to disk, *i.e.*, stored: (a) data is received at Google’s servers and, if Google Signals is enabled, it is duplicated to facilitate logging; (b) Google uses a server to check whether a user is logged into a Google Account and whether consent has been given to join data to the account (the sWAA, GAP, and NAC settings discussed above); and (c) the data sets are cleaned and some data is regenerated to add additional obstacles to joining data.

To do this check, Google uses a DSID (IDFA on iOS). It tells Google who the user is by checking the DSID, which is an encrypted GAIA identifier. There will be no DSID in the HitBundle if the user is not signed into a Google Account. On iOS devices, the IDFA is associated with GAIA when users have logged into their Google Account and have not limited ad tracking. Google also checks to make sure the app developer consents to the tying of GA for Firebase data to users’ accounts.⁵

Importantly, the Google server that receives the HitBundle, called [REDACTED], cannot decrypt the DSID. This is by design. Instead, [REDACTED] must send the encrypted DSID to a different Google server that performs the consent check and then returns to [REDACTED] either a “no consent” signal, or an encrypted GAIA ID. As a result, the hit bundles in short term memory on the [REDACTED] server cannot reflect a user’s identity until a “yes consent” signal is received from a different server, which itself

⁵ See https://www.google.com/url?q=https://support.google.com/analytics/answer/7532985?hl%3Den%23zippy%3D%252Cin-this-article&sa=D&source=editors&ust=1623176595926000&usg=AOvVaw1v59Uqg6gqH_XGgl4Z76xO.

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1 never receives the measurement data logged by GA for Firebase. All of this occurs in short term
2 memory. The upshot of this is that the physical machine that receives the encrypted DSID from
3 user devices isn’t able to decrypt it, and the physical machine that decrypts the DSID doesn’t
4 receive the measurement data, it only gets the fields that can be used to check identity. This is all
5 done to make it even less possible that a bad actor could infiltrate Google’s system and perform an
6 unauthorized “join.”

7 If any aspect of the consent check fails, the user data is not stored in GAIA space, and the
8 DSIS/IDFA is deleted.

9 After the consent check is completed and data is duplicated into two logs, Google removes
10 data from each log to prevent “joining,” which is a technical term that refers to re-identifying
11 pseudonymized users by joining data from disparate parts of data held by Google together.
12 Google takes a number of steps throughout its organization to prevent unauthorized joining of user
13 data, and employees are, generally speaking, barred from doing it. Encryption is used to prevent
14 Google personnel from identifying the data without authorization. Decryption keys are tightly
15 controlled, and destroyed after a set period of time, making it impossible to re-join the data.

16 From the signed-in GAIA copy of data, Google removes all pseudonymous identifiers.
17 From the signed-out pseudonymous log, Google removes all signed-in identifiers. The result is
18 that the two logs don’t overlap identifiers that could be used to join the logs together.

19 Google additionally regenerates data to prevent deterministic joining. A “deterministic”
20 or “probabilistic” join would allow a complicated algorithm to use brute force and probability to
21 guess which data belongs to which person. While the data is still in short term memory, Google
22 creates “fuzziness,” or slight errors, in data to prevent this. For example, Google adds random
23 error into timestamps so they can’t be matched together with timestamps elsewhere.

24 **5. Differentiated Logging**

25 Pseudonymous short-term logs have a 56-day retention period. They store the
26 pseudonymized copy of the user interaction data—that is, they don’t contain any identifying
27 information, so it’s not possible to tell to which user the event data belongs. They are used to
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1 create aggregated event data logs for customer use. GAIA short-term logs contain the same event
2 data but keyed to a specific user.

3 To ensure that joining is practically impossible, Google takes several steps to scrub these
4 logs of data that overlaps with data in other logs. Pseudonymous logs don’t contain GAIA IDs.
5 GAIA logs don’t contain Device ID or app_instance_id. Both logs do contain aeid, or Ad Event
6 ID, but in the pseudonymous log, aeid is encrypted with a 6-day retention key that is different
7 from the encryption key used to encrypt Ad Event ID in GAIA logs. Further, in GAIA logs, aeid is
8 “salted” as well, meaning random data is added to it to make it even harder to match it to the aeid
9 stored in pseudonymous logs. As a practical matter, connecting these to each other is impossible.

10 **6. Google’s Encryption Technology**

11 As further background, Google’s encryption technology creates new encrypted keys every
12 day. This enables the encryption keys to be retained for a fixed period (for example 60 days) of
13 time for decryption purposes. Once the period of time passes, the keys are deleted, making
14 decryption impossible. GA for Firebase also uses a different encryption key for the same user ID
15 in GAIA space as compared to pseudonymous space (and in the case of aeid, in AdMob
16 space). For that reason, it is prohibitively expensive to decrypt data from one log (e.g.,
17 pseudonymous) and join the data with another log.

18 For a set period of time, some IDs (device ID, app instance ID, and ad event ID) are stored
19 and encrypted to allow Google to account for possible delays in data transmission and to fix any
20 errors in data processing, including at customers’ (i.e., app developers’) request.

21 *Device ID and app-instance ID* are stored in encrypted form for 60 days. The reason the
22 keys are stored for 60 days is because there are sometimes errors in the logs that require
23 reprocessing of data. The 60-day window allows for customers to request reprocessing. It also
24 allows Google to scan the logs to determine the amount of data affected by errors, which informs
25 solutions to code issues. Google personnel are barred from using these keys without authorization,
26 Google has monitors in place to ensure such unauthorized use doesn’t happen, and access to the
27 keys is tightly controlled. As a general matter, humans who work for Google would have no
28 reason to gain access to these keys, and they don’t. Computers do use them to reprocess data, as

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1 described here, but this happens without humans learning the keys, not unlike swiping a credit
2 card at a grocery store.

3 *Ad event IDs* are stored in encrypted form for 6 days. These IDs are specific to a user’s
4 particular interaction with an ad. Ad event IDs allow Google to expand the Google Analytics
5 pseudonymous data set with data from ADMob logs *if* the user has provided the proper
6 permissions. Where a user interacts with a product that uses AdMob, that interaction is stored in
7 AdMob logs and that data is joined to the Analytics data set using the ad-event ID.

8 The encryption keys are retained for 6 days to allow for processing time and errors. The
9 processing happens daily and in some cases takes a few hours. If reprocessing of the data is
10 necessary due to some error, the 6-day window allows Google time to do the reprocessing.

11 As discussed above, the ad event ID is the only unique ID common to both GAIA space
12 and signed-out space that would allow for joining of data to a specific user. This means that for
13 the 6-day window in which the ad event ID is stored with encryption, it is theoretically possible
14 for someone with access to both ad event ID encryption keys to join data.

15 Google takes several steps to ensure this does not happen. As described above, Google
16 generates new encryption keys each day and it uses a different key for the same user ad event ID
17 in GAIA space as compared to pseudonymous space. Access to the encryption keys is tightly
18 controlled and even the teams of engineers that create the code for GA for Firebase and related
19 products/services do not have access to the keys. Google also protects the code that requires use
20 of encryption keys. Once the 6-day period has elapsed, it is not possible for Google (or any other
21 bad actor) to rejoin data stored in the pseudonymous logs with a user profile using the ad event ID.

22 Further, Google uses a restricted need-based access process and audit procedure. To begin,
23 Google supports tiered access to the logs stored by GA for Firebase. None of the tiers includes
24 personally identifiable information, but the default access level, for example, includes only event
25 data, so Google employees cannot see any identifiers at all. Querying a log past the default state
26 (i.e., geolocation logs or raw logs) requires a request ticket that allows Google to audit and track
27 the request. Through that system, teams have to explain why they need a specific level of beyond-
28 default access. Even if such access is granted, Google does not allow access forever. There are

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1 temporal restrictions: access is granted for a certain time frame after which teams will need to re-
2 request access.

3 **7. Use of User Data by Customers**

4 User data is made available to external customers from whom the data originally was
5 transmitted so they can conduct analytics and other marketing campaigns. The measurement data
6 collected by Google Analytics for Firebase is used to provide Google customers with insights on
7 app usage and user engagement. GA for Firebase allows sharing Analytics data with Google for
8 improving Google products and services, enabling technical support, benchmarking, and sharing
9 with Account Specialists. More on how shared data is used is [here](#).

10 When data is reported to app developers, it is done so on an aggregated level. After
11 pseudonymous logs are created, a subset of the data in them is then used to create the database for
12 the back-end of GA for Firebase that feeds customers with reports. None of the ID data in that
13 database overlaps with data in GAIA space, so no joining between them is possible. Both datasets
14 do include event data, however, though timestamps are made “fuzzy” to prevent joining, as
15 discussed above.

16 Raw event data may be exported to BigQuery for custom analysis. Google Data Studio
17 can leverage raw Analytics event data through its BigQuery connector, which facilitates the
18 generation of custom reports using Analytics events, parameters and user properties.

19 Users can adjust their data sharing settings in the [Analytics Settings](#) section in the
20 Analytics UI.

21 Google only collects measurement data for apps that have the GA for Firebase SDK built
22 in. Google’s customers can obtain consent from end users to collect data. GA for Firebase
23 customers can opt out of data collection according to the mechanisms discussed [here](#).

24 **8. Use of Pseudonymous User Data by Google**

25 Subject to the data sharing setting “Share with Google to improve products and services,”
26 Google uses user data collected via GA for Firebase across teams for product development,
27 improvement, and diagnostics. As discussed above, Google can also use pseudonymous event data
28 from GA for Firebase logs to target advertising to users, all without personally identifying the

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1 user. Users can opt out of such ad targeting on their device by opting out of ad tracking on their
2 Android or iOS device.

3 With regard to the other products and features that are part of Firebase SDK that may
4 collect overlapping pieces of data, such as device model, app updates, and other types of data,
5 such functionality is publicly documented including on Google’s public help center pages at
6 GOOG-RDGZ-00013288 - GOOG-RDGZ-00013449, which can also be viewed at
7 firebase.google.com and support.google.com.

8 **9. Data Storage and Access – Client-Side**

9 Analytics data is stored in sqlite database on the device. The database is private and only
10 the application has access to it. On Android Play devices the database is stored inside the GMS
11 core services (aka Google Play Services) and the application doesn’t have read access to the
12 database. It can only use the client API to write to the database.

13 The local database stores the temporary raw events until they are uploaded to the Analytics
14 collection endpoint. On successful upload the raw events are deleted from the local database.
15 When the app fails to upload the raw events in 4 weeks data the data is discarded.

16 The local database also stores the user properties, the next sequential number for each
17 event name, the timestamp of the last logged event and last set user property and the next
18 sequential bundle index. Analytics data is uploaded in bundles that contain the current user
19 properties, set of events that happen and app/device metadata.

20 Uninstalling the app clears all Analytics data. Any queued up data for uploading from the
21 app might be uploaded after the app is uninstalled. Data queued up for uploading for more than 4
22 weeks will be discarded.

23 Uninstalling and reinstalling the app appears as a new fresh installation for Analytics. All
24 existing data from the previous installation, including app_instance_id, is deleted. Calling
25 resetAnalyticsData manually has the same effect.

26 *Measurement Processing Pipeline*

27 The Google Analytics for Firebase pipeline can be broken down into multiple components:
28 event ingestion, event widening, event processing, aggregation and query serving. Event ingestion

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1 consumes the collection logs and creates hit bundles which are then output as either events that
2 require special widening or ones that can be output for next stage i.e; event processing. Events that
3 need widening go through a separate flow that takes care of adwords, doubleclick and other
4 integration based event decoration. Finally post widening the events arrive at a stage that can be
5 consumed by event processing. Event processing merges all these events and groups them in an
6 optimized format, queries attribution service and also does read-modify-write of user state from
7 user store [REDACTED]. Output of this stage is the raw baseview store stored in colossus files.
8 Aggregation components consumes these baseview files to create specialized aggregate cubes.
9 Finally query serving component uses [REDACTED] query to read from aggregates and serve responses to
10 front end or API.

11 The infrastructure uses conduit as data processing and replication framework. [REDACTED] is
12 used as execution framework for event processing stage of pipeline. Primary storage is in colossus
13 files in capacitor format. For example; output of event ingestion job, baseview and aggregates.
14 Google has used blobstore as backup storage for baseview and aggregates data.

15 **10. Additional Data Protection Practices**

16 User Data in GA for Firebase backends are kept in the following stores:

- 17 • [REDACTED] / [REDACTED] schema will enable [REDACTED] auditing and all manual access will be logged.
18 Moreover jobs accessing this data needs to be BCID 3 compliant.
- 19 • Persistent CNS files (i.e. TTL longer than 10 days) with encryption keys kept in keystore.
 - 20 ○ There will be [REDACTED] logging on keystore access to these encryption keys.
 - 21 ○ The keystore config enforces BCID 3 compliance on access from production jobs.
 - 22 ○ Production jobs and individuals currently oncall will be granted access to these keys.
 - 23 ○ Developers will not otherwise have direct file access. Instead, they will be granted
24 [REDACTED] read access to these files and the [REDACTED] access will be logged to [REDACTED].

25 For each GA for Firebase pipeline system component, the current oncalls (dev oncalls and
26 SRE) have access to the production data storage. Additionally, break-glass access using access on
27 demand can be obtained by off-call pipeline engineers to debug production issues. This access is
28 granted for 20 hours. All storage is protected by [REDACTED] and encrypted.

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1 **11. Data Deletion**

2 Analytics Measurement data follow the Analytics standard retention policy. Some of the
3 key default storage retention periods in GA for Firebase include:

- 4 ● Collection logs: 8 weeks
5 ● Event ingestion output: 4 days
6 ● Raw baseview: 60 days
7 ● Aggregates: Kept indefinitely

8 **INTERROGATORY NO. 2:**

9 Please identify every app that includes or has included Google’s Firebase SDK since the
10 start of the Class Period, including for each app the time period during which that app used
11 Google’s Firebase SDK and Google therefore would have received data even when users had Web
12 & App Activity turned off (or previously paused).

13 **RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 2:**

14 Google objects to Interrogatory No. 2 as vague and ambiguous as to the undefined term
15 “Web & App Activity.” For purposes of this response, Google construes Web & App Activity to
16 mean the account-level setting called Web & App Activity. Google further objects to this
17 Interrogatory as vague and ambiguous with respect to the phrases “Google therefore would have
18 received the data” and “Firebase SDK.” Google further objects that the definition of “Class
19 Period” is vague and ambiguous, as the Interrogatories define the term to mean “the class period
20 in this case, as defined in the operative complaint,” when the “operative complaint” has changed
21 between when the Interrogatories were served and when these responses were provided, and the
22 definition of “Class Period” differs between the original and amended complaints. Google further
23 objects that the term “Class Period” is vague and ambiguous because it fails to provide a concrete
24 range of time. Google further objects to this Interrogatory to the extent that it seeks information
25 protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or the attorney work product doctrine. Google
26 further objects to this Interrogatory because it is unduly burdensome, overbroad, and
27 disproportionate to the needs of the Action, as it seeks a list of every app that includes or has
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